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COMMENTS
THAT WAS NO WIFE, THAT WAS MY LADY: IS
Marvin v. Marvin APPROPRIATE FOR KENTUCKY?
INTRODUCTION
A man and a woman may live as spouses in one of three
definable relationships. First, they can be married according to
the laws of the sovereign.' Second, they may establish a puta-
tive marriage-a marriage which does not comply with the laws
of the sovereign, but into which at least one of the parties
entered with a reasonable belief that the marriage was valid.'
Finally, they may live as spouses in a meretricious relationship.
Both parties in a meretricious relationship have knowledge
that the relationship is not a valid marriage.3
California, for purposes of dividing property upon dissolu-
tion of marriage, treats the property acquired during a putative
marriage as quasi-marital property, and equates the rights of
the putative spouse upon separation with those of the legiti-
mate spouse.4 On December 27, 1976, the California Supreme
Court recognized the potential for similar treatment of the
meretricious spouse in certain circumstances.5 While the court
E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 402.010-.090 (1972 & Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
KRS]. In this comment, such a spouse will be referred to as a valid spouse or a
legitimate spouse.
2 Comment, Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50 CAL.
L. Rav. 866, 866 (1962).
Id. at 873. This relationship has also been termed "sinful." In re Marriage of
Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 864 (Ct. App. 1973).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452. (West Supp. 1977). The statute provides in part:
Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and
the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that
the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such party or parties to have
the status of a putative spouse, and, if the division of property is in issue,
shall divide, in accordance with Section 4800, that property acquired during
the union which would have been community property or quasi community
property if the union had not been void or voidable. Such property shall be
termed "quasi-marital property."
5 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). It is fairly clear that
the California Supreme Court did not, with its decision in Marvin, extend the property
rights of a legitimate spouse to the spouse in a meretricious relationship. See text
accompanying note 6 infra for recognition of this fact. This facet of the decision was
largely ignored by the media. H. Kay & C. Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the
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expressly noted that a meretricious spouse was not "married," 6
and therefore not entitled to the rights of a valid spouse, the
court's decision requires California courts to examine the rela-
tionship of a separating couple in order to determine whether
a spouse had an equitable interest in the community property.7
The purpose of this comment is to trace briefly the devel-
opment of the California position and compare the develop-
ment of Kentucky law in the area of spousal property rights.
This comparison will then be used to determine whether Ken-
tucky should adopt California's treatment of the meretricious
spouse.'
I. THE DEVELOPMENT UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS ARISING FROM MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS
A. Rights Based on Marital Property Law
California, by statute, places the putative spouse on an
equal footing with the legitimate spouse regarding property
rights in the "marital" property? Decisions of the California
courts recognized this equality long before adoption of the stat-
ute. In Coats v. Coats"° a California court established for the
first time that a putative spouse could receive disposition of
Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 937, 954 n.104 (1977). As noted, "Marvin enjoys the singular
honor of being one of the most misunderstood decisions of modern times." Id. at 954.
The practical effect of Marvin is to produce similar treatment of the meretricious
spouse and the valid spouse. See note 95 infra and accompanying text for an example
of the similarity of treatment in California. This comment examines those factors
which the California Supreme Court considered in deciding the property rights of the
meretricious spouse upon dissolution of the relationship.
6 557 P.2d at 122 n.24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831 n.24.
Id. at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
1 This consideration is worthwhile even recognizing that California is a
"community property" state and Kentucky is a "common law" property state. The
California Supreme Court, in Marvin, "rejected the invitation to modify existing com-
munity property law, relying instead upon doctrines drawn from the laws of contract,
trust, partnership, and restitution. In so doing, the court fashioned a remedy appropri-
ate for use in any state, regardless of the underlying form of its marital property law."
Kay & Amyx, supra note 5, at 938.
' CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 4452, 4800 (West Supp. 1977). A portion of § 4452 is set out
at note 4 supra. While the concern here is merely with the division of property, there
are related questions which arise upon termination of an invalid marriage. For a
discussion of alimony, a spousal share in the decedent's property, and workmen's
compensation death benefits, see Kay & Amyx, supra note 5, at 941.
,o 118 P. 441 (Cal. 1911).
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marital property upon dissolution in much the same way as a
valid spouse. Although the property was not technically
"community property," the court held that the rules of com-
munity property could be applied by analogy, using "equitable
principles."" Under California's community property law, a
valid spouse is entitled to a share of the property regardless of
that spouse's proportional contribution to its acquisition.12 By
analogy, the proportionate contribution of each party in a pu-
tative relationship is also immaterial. 3
The path of the meretricious spouse took a much different
turn. The property rights of the meretricious spouse were first
set forth in Vallera v. Vallera.1 The plaintiff brought an action
for separate maintenance and division of community property
based on a common law marriage to the defendant. The court
found that the defendant was already legally married and thus
there had been no common law marriage. 5 Moreover, the court
found neither party had a good faith belief that their relation-
ship constituted a legally recognizable marriage. Absent such
a belief, cohabitation alone would give rise to no property
rights. 6 The court would allow certain property rights only if
the plaintiff had entered an agreement to combine earnings
and share equally in joint accumulations, or had established
the proportion which her funds contributed to the acquisition
of the property.'
7
Justice Curtis, in dissent, laid the foundation for the later
expansion in Marvin v. Marvin. 11 His opinion was based on the
" Id. at 444.
2 Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 69 P.2d 845 (Cal. 1937).
"118 P. at 441.
" 134 P.2d 761 (Cal. 1943).
" Id. at 762.
" Id. at 763. This result is based on the idea that the status of marriage gives rise
to a reasonable expectation of certain benefits. Absent a good faith belief in a valid
marriage, the accompanying benefits could not be present. Id.
" Id. Any agreement between cohabiting parties not limited specifically to finan-
cial matters might be invalid if based on the illicit cohabitation. See Hill v. West-
brook's Estate, 213 P.2d 727, 730 (Cal. App. 1950) (the court severed the portion of
the contract based on illicit cohabitation). Cf. Cougler v. Fackler, 510 S.W.2d 16 (Ky.
1974) (a bargain based in whole or in part on consideration of illicit sexual intercourse
is invalid).
I'A 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). Whatever reading is given Marvin, it
cannot be denied that the case was an expansion of California law. Kay & Amyx, supra
note 5, at 956. See also Comment, Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried
Cohabitation: Marvin v. Marvin, 90 HARv. L. Rlv. 1708, 1713 (1977).
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following progression of California law: (1) a valid wife is enti-
tled to a one-half interest in the community property; (2) this
division also applies to parties who think they are married even
if in fact they are not; (3) an express agreement to share jointly
accumulated property, despite illicit cohabitation, is valid and
binding; and (4) contributions made by a meretricious spouse
to the acquisition of property are valid and binding. 9 Curtis
asked why, if an express agreement was valid and binding, an
implied agreement would not also be binding. Curtis argued
that an implied agreement to share jointly acquired property
should be found to exist whenever the woman contributed her
services in the home,2 0 discarding what he felt was the only
argument against recognizing such an equitable principle: non-
recognition is necessary to punish the woman for being in-
volved in an illicit relationship.
21
The Vallera decision presented problems for other courts;
they were forced to equate a meretricious relationship to a
"market place transaction" in order to provide a basis for dis-
posing of property upon the dissolution of the relationship.22
Keene v. Keene2 3 interpreted the contribution exception in
Vallera narrowly. In Keene, the couple lived together for eight-
een years without being married. The "wife" worked on their
farm by raising turkeys, chickens, sheep, and cattle; clearing
land; sowing, raising, and harvesting the grain crops; and grow-
ing and harvesting the nut crops. The court held that these
services were not a contribution of funds within the meaning
of Vallera so that the woman had no protectable interest in the
jointly accumulated property.24
" 134 P.2d at 763-64.
2 Id. at 764. Such service would primarily include homemaking.
21 Id. at 764. Curtis felt this rationale was unsound especially when one realized
that an equally "guilty" party would profit by not having to divide the property. This
idea was not accepted in Marvin. Instead, the court agreed with the majority in
Vallera. The Marvin court held that while a putative marriage contains an expectation
of a legal marriage and the incidents thereof, a meretricious relationship does not.
Thus, no punishment is involved in failing to award that which was not expected. 557
P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
" See Pinnolis, Illicit Cohabitation: The Impact of the Vallera and Kene Cases
on the Rights of the Meretricious Spouse, 6 U. CAL. D. L. REv. 354, 361 (1973) and the
cases cited therein.
' 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
24 Id. at 332, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
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The dissent, voiced by Justice Peters, noted the double
standard established by allowing the equally "guilty" man to
take all the property, 25 and also advocated the position taken
by Justice Curtis in Vallera .2 While favoring an implied agree-
ment to share equally in jointly accumulated property, Justice
Peters would have required more than "mere wifely" duties.27
In addition, Justice Peters argued against attaching this par-
ticular legal disadvantage to cohabitation, observing that if
two people were not living together and other circumstances
were identical to those in Keene, a business relationship and
implied contract would exist. 8
The California Court of Appeals vindicated the Keene and
Vallera dissenters in In re Marriage of Cary. While noting that
community property principles had previously been applied to
putative spouses but that meretricious spouses had been de-
nied relief, the court held that the passage of the Family Law
Act had altered this situation. The court felt that the Act
announced the California legislature's intent that concepts of
guilt and inn6cence were no longer relevant in determining
family property rights, enabling the court to treat the meretri-
cious spouse as the putative spouse, provided that an actual
family relationship existed.31 The objective of the decision was
" Id. at 336, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
Id. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra for Justice Curtis' position.
371 P.2d at 338, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
21 Id. Cf. In re Estate of Thornton, 499 P.2d 864 (Wash. 1972). The Washington
Supreme Court was faced with a claim to property by a woman who had maintained
a meretricious relationship with a man for 16 years and had taken part in the manage-
ment of their cattle ranch. "The record [was] clear that [she] worked hard in the
cattle-raising project over a period of 16 years and that her efforts significantly contrib-
uted to the success of the business venture." Id. at 865.
Rejecting a dismissal of her claim, the court held that she had presented sufficient
evidence to support a finding that an implied partnership had been created. Id. at 867-
68. In addition, the court held that a "relatively longterm, stable meretricious relation-
ship in which the partners hold themselves out as husband and wife," may give rise
to property rights. Id. at 866.
Upon retrial, the trial court found, and was affirmed by the Washington Court of
Appeals, that (a) the woman was a managerial employee and not a partner, and (b)
the couple had not held itself out as being man and wife. In re Estate of Thornton,
541 P.2d 1243, 1246-47 (Wash. App. 1973).
2 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Ct. App. 1973).
SCAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1970). The court focused primarily on § 4452
which was substantially the same as that set out in note 4 supra.
11 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
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applauded, but the court's reasoning was widely criticized,
mainly on the grounds that it was not the intent of the legisla-
ture to include the meretricious spouse under the Family Law
Act.32 However, the Marvin decision soon laid the controversy
to rest.
B. Property Rights Based on Nonmarital Remedies
The California Supreme Court agreed in some respects
with the criticisms leveled against Cary.33 In Marvin v.
Marvin, 3 for example, the court supported the result in Cary,
but not the rationale.15 Michelle Marvin, plaintiff, and Lee
Marvin, defendant, had lived together for seven years without
marrying. All the property acquired by the couple had been
placed in the defendant's name. Plaintiff gave up her career as
a professional singer in order to assume "wifely chores" on
defendant's behalf. The parties allegedly entered into an oral
agreement whereby they would "combine their efforts and
earnings and would share equally any and all property accumu-
lated as a result of their efforts whether individual or com-
bined. '36 Since California enforced specific agreements to pool
joint accumulations, 37 the plaintiff had a protectable interest
in the property, assuming that the oral agreement could be
proven. The court rejected the argument that the contract was
against public policy and therefore void, because of its facilita-
32 Comment, In re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 1226 (1974); Comment, In re Marriage of Carey [sic]; The End of the
Putative-Meretricious Spouse Distinction in California, 12 SAN Dm- o L. REv. 436
(1975); Note, In re Marriage of Cary: Equitable Rights Granted to the Meretricious
Spouse, 9 U.S.F. L. REv. 186 (1974).
Judicial criticism also followed. Compare Beckman v. Mayhew, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604
(Ct. App. 1975)(rejection of Cary) with Estate of Atherley, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Ct. App.
1975) (acceptance of Cary).
One basic criticism was that if the concept of good faith were no longer to be a
factor, there would have been no need to provide specifically for the rights of the
putative spouse in CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452. Comment, In re Cary: A Judicial Recognition
of Illicit Cohabitation, supra, at 1232-35.
See note 32 and accompanying text supra for these criticisms.
557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). Procedurally, Marvin was an appeal
from a judgment for defendant on the pleadings. Thus, the case speaks only to whether
a cause of action exists and assumes plaintiff's allegations are true.
Id. at 120-21, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829-30.
Id. at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
a See note 17 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of these agreements.
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tion of an immoral relationship. Such contracts were held to be
void only to the extent that they were based on illegal or immo-
ral consideration.
38
Marvin's importance is due to its considered dicta more
than to its holding. The court clearly indicated that the plain-
tiff could have property rights even absent an express agree-
ment.39 The court rejected the reasoning in Cary, holding that
the Family Law Act did not extend to meretricious relation-
ships. Instead, the court adopted the approach of Justice Cur-
tis' dissent in Vallera,4° reasoning that a court could not logi-
cally enforce an express contract between nonmarital partners
while ignoring the "common law principle that holds that im-
plied contracts can arise from the conduct of the parties." 41 The
court also rejected the limited meaning of "funds" announced
in Keene42 by including the contribution of services within its
definition of "funds."4 The effect of the decision is to treat
cohabitors only as other unmarried persons, and not as puta-
tive spouses," thus providing for the lawful, reasonable expec-
tations of the parties to be fulfilled.45 The judicial attitude
evident in Marvin is a result of "nonmarital relationships in
modern society and the social acceptance of them"4 more than
a product of any logical extension of equitable doctrines. Ulti-
mately, the result requires courts to scrutinize the financial
relationship of the man and the woman.47
39 557 P.2d at 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
39 Id. at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32. Such remedies could be based on implied
agreements, resulting trusts, joint ventures, implied partnerships, constructive trusts,
or quantum meruit. Id.
The suggestion has been made that the implied-in-fact remedies might be limited
in use. This belief is based on the fact that courts may be "reluctant to find non-
gratuitous intent and implied contracts in a familial setting where transactions are not
at arm's length and where many benefits undoubtedly are conferred without any
expectation of return." Comment, supra note 18, at 1715.
,6 134 P.2d 761, 763-64 (Cal. 1943). For a portion of Justice Curtis' reasoning, see
notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
,1 557 P.2d at 118, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
42 See text accompanying note 24 supra for the Keene definition.
;3 557 P.2d at 119, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
" Id. at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
11 Id. at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
46 Id.
11 In scrutinizing the relationship, Marvin provides few concrete guidelines. For a
suggestion of some of the relevant factors in this examination, see Kay & Amyx, supra
note 5, at 968-73. The authors recommend use of the following presumption to best
1978]
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Justice Clark concurred insofar as the decision recognized
the validity of an express or implied-in-fact agreement between
the parties.48 However, Clark took the majority to task for pro-
viding broad equitable remedies defined and limited only by an
extremely vague outline. Contending that the court created
more problems than it solved, Clark wrote that "the majority
perform[ed] a nunc pro tunc marriage, dissolve[d] it, and
distribute[d] its property on terms never contemplated by the
parties, case law or the Legislature."49
I. KENTUCKY LAW ON PUTATIVE AND MERETRICIOUS
RELATIONSHIPS
A comparison of Kentucky law with the analysis of Califor-
nia law in Justice Curtis' dissent in Vallera v. Vallera" is help-
ful in determining the appropriateness of adopting the Marvin
position in Kentucky. This comparison requires an examina-
tion of Kentucky law regarding property rights of legitimate
and nonlegitimate spouses, and also regarding spousal agree-
ments and contributions. The law of contracts, trusts, and res-
titution have affected the property rights of the nonlegitimate
spouse in Kentucky.
A. Spousal Property Rights Upon Dissolution of a Valid
Marriage
The Kentucky method for the division of marital property
combines the concept of community property (a 50/50 division)
with the principles of equity. Generally, Kentucky courts have
the authority to divide equitably property accumulated by
incorporate the modem view of the social relationship into the law.
An unmarried couple who live together without an express agreement as to
property, who have mutually and deliberately chosen not to marry, who are
financially self-supporting, and who represent themselves as unmarried
thereby indicate their lack of expectation that either will share in property
accumulated by the other during the relationship, except to the extent they
may have contributed funds or services to specific acquisitions or particular
ventures.
Id. at 972.
557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
" Id. at 124, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
134 P.2d 761, 763-64 (Cal. 1943). See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra
for a discussion of this analysis.
[Vol. 66
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both spouses during the marriage. Title to any specific property
is not controlling."
Colley v. Colley52 was an attempt by Kentucky's highest
court to resolve long standing confusion on the proper classifi-
cation of property at the dissolution of a valid marriage. The
Court found that Kentucky's alimony53 and restoration of prop-
erty54 statutes had been misconstrued by the lower courts so
that a wife had no equitable interest in property which she
helped her husband accumulate through either her domestic
services or her separate earnings. To rectify this situation, the
Court held that property acquired by joint effort should be
divided between the parties according to what is just and rea-
sonable.56 Such a just and reasonable division is to be accom-
plished by first dividing property acquired by "team effort"
according to the proportional contribution of each spouse to the
total effort, with the domestic services of each spouse a factor
in determining the proportional effort. Second, the trial judge
must decide whether a spouse is entitled to an equitable pay-
ment as alimony; the relative "fault" of the parties is not to
be a proper consideration in such a decision.57
The bipartite procedure prescribed in Colley is still used
today. In fact, the 1972 statute which describes the disposition
of property upon dissolution of the marriage58 seems to be a
codification of Colley. 9 Kentucky Revised Statutes § 403.190
(1)(a) specifically makes the contribution of the spouse as a
homemaker a factor to be considered in dividing marital prop-
erty. Proportional shares in property allocated to a spouse as a
homemaker have been approved on appeal ranging from 1/ to
1/2.61
1, R. PrRnLi, KENTUCKY FAmmy LAW 28-31 (Supp. 1974).
52 460 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1970).
KRS § 403.060(1) (1970) (repealed 1972).
" KRS § 403.065 (1970) (repealed 1972).
11 460 S.W.2d at 825.
5, Id. at 826. However, fault is considered in determining the amount of alimony.
Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1973).
', Id. at 827.
KRS § 403.190 (Supp. 1976).
5' See PETRLI, supra note 51, at 29-31 (Supp. 1974).
Heustis v. Heustis, 346 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Ky. 1961).
" Lockard v. Lockard, 205 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Ky. 1947).
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B. Property Rights of the Nonlegitimate Spouse
Unlike most jurisdictions,62 no Kentucky decision has ever
squarely confronted the issue of the rights of a putative spouse
to a division of accumulated property. However, Kentucky
courts have tackled the related questions of first, awarding
alimony to a putative or meretricious spouse, and second, re-
covery of workmen's compensation by the putative or meretri-
cious spouse. While the division "of property acquired during
marriage by the team effort of the marital partners, is, strictly
speaking, not alimony," 3 the situations are similar enough to
warrant examination.
The strongest indicator that Kentucky will not allow a
putative spouse to be treated on a par with a valid spouse for
the division of property is the legislative intent evidenced by
the form of Kentucky's version of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act. 4 Section 209 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act provides, in part, that "[a] putative spouse acquires the
rights conferred upon a legal spouse, including the right to
maintenance following termination of his status. . . ."I' Ken-
tucky, however, omitted this section when it adopted the Act. 6
Nevertheless, the comments to the Uniform Act provide that
"[p]assage of the Act without this section should not. . . be
62 Several jurisdictions follow the California rule and hold that when an innocent
person marries in good faith a person who is incapable of marriage, the innocent person
is entitled to an interest in the property accumulated by the joint efforts of the parties
during the relationship. This rule is not confined to community property states. See,
e.g., Albae v. Harbin, 30 So.2d 459 (Ala. 1947); Schlamberg v. Schlamberg, 41 N.E.2d
801 (Ind. 1942); Fuller v. Fuller, 7 P. 241 (Kan. 1885); Donnelly v. Donnelly, 84 A.2d
89 (Md. 1951); Batty v. Greene, 92 N.E. 715 (Mass. 1910); Allen v. Allen, 10 N.W. 113
(Mich. 1881); Chrismond v. Chrismond, 52 So.2d 624 (Miss. 1951); Reed v. Reed, 516
S.W.2d 568 (Mo. App. 1974); Fowler v. Fowler, 84 A.2d 836 (N.H. 1951); Conkling v.
Conkling, 8 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1936); Lawrence v. Heavner, 61 S.E.2d 697 (N.C. 1950);
Walker v. Walker, 84 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio 1948); Krauter v. Krauter, 190 P. 1088 (Okla.
1945); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153 P.2d 262 (Utah 1944); Buckley v. Buckley, 96 P. 1079
(Wash. 1908); Philips v. Philips, 144 S.E. 875 (W. Va. 1928); and Siskoy v. Siskoy, 27
N.W.2d 488 (Wis. 1947).
Some states statutorily recognize the rights of the putative spouse. E.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-2-111 (1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-12 (Supp. 1975).
13 Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d 821, 826 (Ky. 1970).
64 KRS §§ 403.010, 403.110-.350 (Supp. 1976).
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 209.
"The comment at 9 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED; MATRIMONIAL, FAMILY, AND
HEALTH LAws § 209, at 363 (Supp. 1974-77) indicates variations from the official text
by adopting jurisdictions.
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taken to imply a legislative judgment adverse to continuing
development of this or similar doctrines by the case law." 7
Therefore it is necessary to examine Kentucky case law in the
alimony and workmen's compensation cases.
In Strode v. Strode,68 the appellee, whose husband had
been missing for five years, married the appellant. Appellant
later abandoned her and answered her claim for alimony by
stating that he already had a wife in Texas, thus his marriage
to appellee was void. The Court held that the appellant was
estopped from benefiting from his own wrong. Since the
woman was entirely blameless and had married in good faith,
alimony was granted.
The result in Strode was later rejected in Rose v. Rose.69
In Rose, the wife had entered into two marriages. Even though
at the time of her second marriage she thought her first hus-
band was dead, the wife was denied alimony. The Court at-
tempted to distinguish Strode by noting that the husband was
the bigamous spouse in that case. However, in both cases the
wife had a good faith belief that she could enter a valid mar-
riage. The Court repudiated the Strode allowance of alimony
to a putative spouse, holding that "when the marriage has been
finally determined to be void, no allowance can be made, for
the court has power only to make such orders in favor of a
lawful wife." 70 In Jones v. Jones7" the Court reemphasized the
Rose position that no alimony could be awarded to a putative
spouse. Although the good faith of the woman entering the
bigamous marriage was not nearly as clear as in Rose, the Jones
opinion echoes the inflexibility of the Rose decision, holding
that the putative spouse is not "entitled to any of the benefits
ordinarily accruing to a wife who obtains a divorce from her
husband."72 Given the denial of alimony to a bigamous spouse,
even when the spouse believed in good faith that the marriage
was valid, and the apparent rejection of alimony for the spouse
who marries an already married individual, Kentucky courts
have apparently foreclosed any right to alimony for a putative
'7 UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 209 (Commissioner's Note).
0 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 227 (1867).
"' 118 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Ky. 1938).
7o Id.
71 231 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1950).
72 Id. at 18.
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spouse, at least when the putative relationship is the result of
bigamy.
The putative spouse is treated as a legitimate spouse in the
field of workmen's compensation while the meretricious spouse
is not. In Andrews v. Kopper Coal Co., 3 the woman
"remarried" after she honestly thought her first husband was
dead. Later, her second husband died under circumstances
which would allow his spouse to collect workmen's compensa-
tion. A necessary condition for recovery of benefits is depend-
ency on the deceased, with a wife presumed to be wholly depen-
dent. Nevertheless, the company denied that Mrs. Andrews
could benefit from this presumption, since her first husband
was still alive. The Court held that "the parties were to all
intents legally married; if the marriage was contracted in good
faith, the claimant was the lawful wife of deceased em-
ployee."" However, it is difficult to determine if this liberal
attitude will carry over to a division of property since here the
putative spouse is not recovering from the other spouse, a fac-
tor which may well have influenced the Court.
Similar claims by a meretricious spouse have been denied.
In Norrington v. Charles E. Cannell Co.,7" the Court refused to
allow workmen's compensation to a woman who lived with a
man for seventeen years without ever being married. In Jones
v. Campbell Co.,71 the Court held that although the woman was
wholly dependent, the fact that she had lived with the dece-
dent without getting married barred recovery. This restrictive
judicial attitude seems to persist today,7 indicating that the
meretricious spouse has little if any basis for making a claim.
C. Property Rights Based on Nonmarital Remedies
Kentucky courts have recognized certain types of interests
in property accumulated by couples that live together. In
Smith v. Smith,7 the couple lived together, unmarried, for
fifteen years. They married in 1963 and then separated in 1964.
73 161 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. 1942).
1, Id. at 55.
75 383 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1964).
11 353 S.W.2d 208 (Ky. 1961).
1 PETmLI, supra note 51, at 9.
7A 497 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1973).
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The Court directed the chancellor, in distributing property
pursuant to a divorce proceeding, first to assign to the wife any
property acquired before marriage in which she had a legally
recognizable interest, and secondly to divide the property ac-
quired through the joint effort of the parties during the mar-
riage." Unfortunately, the Court provided no indication as to
what constitutes a "legally recognizable and enforceable inter-
est."8 The following cases provide an indication of the scope
and limits of such an interest.
The case of Arnz v. Johnson1 involved a couple who had
obtained a divorce but later sought to have it annulled. Unfor-
tunately, since the couple's attorney forgot to file the petition
for annulment, their living arrangement after their reunion was
illicit. When her "husband" died, Mrs. Arnz asked for a wife's
share in the estate. The Court held that since the divorce had
not been annulled, there was no valid marriage; therefore Mrs.
Arnz could not be treated as a wife.12 Thus the Court again
rejected equating the putative spouse with the validly married
spouse. However, the Court in Arnz v. Arnz Adm'r, 83 found that
a contract existed between the decedent and Mrs. Arnz. Mr.
Arnz had promised to will his entire estate to Mrs. Arnz if she
would quit her employment and assume the duties of a house-
wife. The Court found that the contract was not against public
policy, and was therefore binding, since it had not been based
upon illicit consideration. 4
In Donnelly v. Donnelly's Heirs,5 a woman, in good faith,
married a man who was already married. His first wife subse-
quently died and the couple continued to live together, the
woman still ignorant of the first marriage. The husband died
11 Id. at 419 (citing KRS § 403.190 (1972) and Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d 821
(Ky. 1970)).
8 497 S.W.2d at 418, 419. The Court's only suggestion was made in connection
with the chancellor's finding that the wife had not contributed any money toward the
purchase price of the property acquired during the pre-marital cohabitation. The Court
noted that "contribution of money is not the only factor to be considered in these
circumstances." Id.
"186 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1945).
Id. at 5, 6.
195 S.W.2d 79 (Ky. 1946).
Id. at 81. This position is in line with the policy of California courts. See note
17 and accompanying text supra for an explanation of this policy.
" 47 Ky. (8. B. Mon.) 113 (1847).
1978]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
seventeen years later. The Court held that even if the woman
were not entitled to the "wifely" right of dower she had an
equitable claim to relief which the husband, and consequently
his heirs, were estopped from denying. s6 However, this claim
was based on the fact that the woman had brought a substan-
tial estate into the relationship and was defrauded of it by the
decedent. Thus the Court's decision did not amount to a recog-
nition of the putative spouse but was a recognition of the possi-
bility of fraud in this situation.
The restitutionary interest of an unmarried cohabitor has
also been legally recognized. In Cougler v. Fackler 7 a man
engaged in an illicit relationship with a woman gave the woman
a sum, of money based on her promise to buy a house with the
money and deed it to him when she obtained title. The Court
decided that such a promise would be binding provided the
illicit relationship formed no part of the consideration. In this
case, however, the man could not recover on a contract basis,
since the Statute of Frauds was violated. Nevertheless, the
Court used its equity power to restore to the man the amounts
paid to the woman in performance of the agreement." In a
similar case, a woman cohabited with a man and gave him $500
to purchase land. The Court established a trust in her favor to
the extent of the purchase money. 9
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion, on the surface, seems to indicate
that Kentucky courts will recognize certain property rights in
the putative and meretricious spouse. Trusts have been estab-
lished for the meretricious spouse; express contracts between
putative spouses have been enforced. In addition, Kentucky
recognizes that an implied contract is merely a form of express
contract. Using the reasoning advanced by the California
" Id. at 119. Actually, the Court held that the parties were legally married to each
other at the time of the decedent's death, thus the wife was entitled to dower. In stating
that the woman may not have been entitled to dower, the Court was merely presenting
the result if she were found not to be married.
510 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. 1974).
Id. at 18, 19.
a' McDonald v. Fleming, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 285, 288 (1851).
Victor's Ex'r v. Monson, 283 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Ky. 1955).
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Supreme Court in Marvin v. Marvin,9" it appears inconsistent
to recognize common-law applications of express contracts in
meretricious relationships and yet to reject similar application
of implied contracts. Acceptance of this idea would require
courts to examine the relationship between meretricious cou-
ples to determine whether the conduct of the parties estab-
lished an implied contract to share in the jointly accumulated
assets.
However, this line of reasoning is not convincing in the
context of Kentucky law. First, extension of the California
common law was based on a clear acceptance of the putative
spouse's property rights.2 Kentucky seems reluctant, from
both a legislative and a judicial standpoint, to make this clear
acceptance. 3 Second, the Marvin ruling allows a meretricious
spouse to recover an equitable share, an amount which may or
may not equal what a spouse would recover. 4 The factors the
California court examines to determine the amount of this
share are similar to those which Kentucky courts examine in
the disposition of property upon dissolution of a valid mar-
riage." If the Marvin concepts were accepted in Kentucky, the
" 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
2 See text accompanying notes 9-13 supra for an analysis of these rights in Califor-
nia.
,, See text accompanying notes 62-77 supra in which the rejection of the doctrine
is discussed.
1 The Minnesota Supreme Court recently decided to accept the Marvin rationale
and limit the disposition of property to the meretricious spouse by using the principles
of equity. Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977). The unmarried couple in
that case lived together for 21 years, holding themselves out as man and wife. The man
supplied all funds for the acquisition of real and personal property while the woman
worked solely in the home. The court rejected the woman's attempt to recover property
as a wife. Instead, the property was divided equally based on the theory that the man
had made an irrevocable gift of those assets acquired with his earnings. The woman's
contribution was treated similarly. Id. at 255. In trying to fulfill the intentions of the
parties, the court used the Minnesota partition statute to divide the property. Thus,
the court utilized a statute to effectuate the intent of the parties.
," As noted, Marvin provides few guidelines for its myriad of remedies. See note
47 supra for a further discussion of this problem and a suggestion of the factors the
court should consider. Compare these factors with those listed in KRS § 403.190 (Supp.
1976) which provides in part:
(1) [The court] shall divide the marital property without regard to marital
misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant factors including:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, in-
cluding contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(b) Value of the property set apart to each spouse;
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meretricious spouse could recover essentially that which a valid
spouse is awarded. The differences between the two states of
"marriage," in terms of disposition of property, would be mini-
mal. Such a result would seem to be in opposition to the public
policy of strengthening and preserving the integrity of the insti-
tution of marriage. 6 While California supports a similar policy,
the Marvin court did not adequately explain why their decision
would not weaken the institution of marriage.
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Finally, there are additional difficulties due to the over-
breadth of the Marvin decision. As Justice Clark pointed out
in his dissent, the majority has probably restored the necessity
of producing evidence of the conditions existing between the
parties at the time of dissolution." The precise effect to be
given to the Statute of Frauds,99 the possibility of extending
Marvin to homosexual relationships, the uncertainty in the
valuation of services, and the difficulty of proving an implied
contract ' are some of the many potential problems presented
by the broad language of the Marvin decision. In short, "it
remains to be seen whether the implied remedy portion of the
(c) Duration of the marriage, and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is
to become effective .....
,1 Kentucky, by statute, has adopted this policy. KRS § 403.110(1) (Supp. 1976).
17 557.P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. The court noted:
The argument that granting remedies to the nonmarital partners would dis-
courage marriage must fail; as Cary pointed out, "with equal or greater force
the point might be made that the pre-1970 rule was calculated to cause the
income producing partner to avoid marriage and thus retain the benefit of
all of his or her accumulated earnings.
Id.
To the extent that people consider property divisions before entering a relation-
ship, the court ignored the fact that this situation could discourage a person from
entering a meretricious relationship. If Kentucky were to adopt the Marvin concepts,
the non-income producing spouse could receive essentially the same amount upon
dissolution of the relationship, whether married or not. As long as one party knows that
his efforts will not be protected if a meretricious relationship is established, that party
would be discouraged from entering such a relationship.
18 Id. at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
" The court rejected application of the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 115, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 824. However, it has been suggested that the requirement of a writing for a
marriage settlement is sufficiently analogous to a contract for nonmarital cohabitation
to require some documentation. Comment, Property Rights of Unmarried Cohabitors
on Dissolution of the Relationship, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 494, 497 (1977).
11 There appears to be no reason why it could not, as the decision espouses reme-
dies which have no basis in marriage.
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opinion will engender more confusion than justice."'' °
If the California Supreme Court had limited itself to allow-
ing property rights for the meretricious spouse only within a
familial relationship, confusion would be minimal. Under such
an alternative system the quasi-marital rights of the putative
spouse would be protected whenever the court determines that
a familial relationship existed.' 2 It has been contended that
such a procedure would merely tolerate meretricious relation-
ships, not encourage them.' 3 However, this idea implies recog-
nition of the rights of the putative spouse. As noted earlier,
Kentucky has chosen not to recognize these rights.' 4
Given Kentucky's seeming rejection of equal treatment for
the putative spouse, and its obvious rejection of any recovery
by the meretricious spouse, it would seem that Kentucky
should not, at this time, adopt a position similar to that taken
in Marvin. Should Kentucky courts decide to follow the general
rule on treatment of the putative spouse, and should the courts
or the legislature take at least a neutral position on the need
to encourage marriage, then the adoption of Marvin would be
logically consistent with the rest of Kentucky law. As the law
now stands in Kentucky, however, what was a logical step for
California would be an illogical leap for Kentucky.
Michael Braden
Comment, supra note 18, at 1720.
See Note, supra note 32, at 204. A familial relationship is one in which the
parties act the roles of married partners.
2 Id. See also Latham v. Hennessey, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wash. 1976).
' See text accompanying notes 62-77 supra in which the rejection of the doctrine
is discussed.
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